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We consider a dual labor market with a continuum of heterogeneous
workers di⁄erentiated by their ability of acquiring a speci c skill. In the
primary sector, jobs require rm-speci c training and rms set e¢ciency
wages. In the secondary sector, wages are competitive and no training is
required. Given workers heterogeneity, rms in the primary sector face an
elastic labor supply, so that they can be labor constrained at the e¢ciency
wage. When this is the case, we show that rms may optimally choose to
bear all the training cost in order to relax the labor supply constraint.1
1
1 Introduction
if workers bear a
part of the training cost, they are not equally willing to enter into the primar
sector so that this sector faces a nitely elastic labor supply
so that workers can be viewed as homogeneous
with respect to the secondary sector.
Another way of di⁄erentiating the two sectors is to consider that primary sectors are more
unionized than secondary ones. In this case, it is not the type of jobs that makes the two sectors
di⁄erent but the fact that institutions di⁄er between sectors.
E¢ciency wage models explain why rms do not want to cut wages when invol-
untary unemployment prevails. They provide a theoretical foundation for the
existence of a dual labor market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). A dual labor
market consists of two sectors. In the primary sector, jobs are stable and are
well paid. In the secondary one, these features are absent. Jobs tend to be
short-term and low wage. The main di⁄erence between the two sectors is the
type of jobs o⁄ered. Assuming that primary jobs are more complex than sec-
ondary jobs so that it is more di¢cult to monitor workers performance, it is
optimal for rms to pay an e¢ciency wage to deter shirking. The wage dif-
ferences between sectors re ect the presence of an e¢ciency wage (Akerlof and
Yellen, 1986) in the primary sector which is above the market clearing wage or
the minimum wage in the secondary sector (Bulow and Summers, 1987, Krueger
and Summers, 1988, Klundert, 1989, Albrecht and Vroman, 1992, Saint-Paul,
1996, Smith and Zenou, 1997 among others). Thus, it is the di⁄erence in
wage setting behavior that explains why, in equilibrium, identical workers earn
di⁄erent wages.
In the present paper, we also consider a dual labor market with e¢ciency
wages in the primary sector. Relying on the idea that jobs are more complex
in this sector, we assume that a speci c quali cation level must be acquired
by workers which involves a training cost (see Taubman and Wachter, 1986,
for other justi cations of the fact that rm-speci c training is important in th
primary sector). Our key assumption is that workers are totally heterogeneous
in their ability of acquiring the required skill. It follows that,
. In the secondary
sector, no training is required
Observe that the idea of introducing labor heterogeneity in a dual labor
market is not new. In particular, workers can di⁄er in terms of the value placed
on leisure (Albrecht and Vroman, 1992), their exogenous turnover probability
(Jones 1987), their productivity (McCormick, 1990), Gottfries and McCormick,
1995).
In our model, rms set an e¢ciency wage (Solow, 1979) in the primary
sector since labor productivity depends on workers e⁄ort: rms induce optimal
e⁄ort through (e¢ciency) wages. In this context, they set optimally their labor
demand but can however face labor supply constraint at this wage. We show
that two market outcomes may result at the Solow e¢ciency wage.
1who nance the training cost ?
our model suggests
that in the presence of an heterogeneous workforce, e¢ciency considerations may
explain why rms would be willing to bear the training costs.
First, a standard dual labor market may be observed. Labor rationing can
arise in equilibrium when some workers are forced to work in the secondary
sector even though they want to work in the primary one at the prevailing
wage. If the rm bears a part of the training cost, these workers will be the
ones that have the average level of ability of the distribution. Why ? Because
workers with very low ability will never apply for a primary job since their
training costs are too large and very high ability workers will always be hired
in the primary sector since rms bear a part of the training cost. Thus workers
with middle ability level will be very sensitive to demand shocks and to the way
training costs are shared between the workers and the rm. At the prevailing
wage, workers bene t from di⁄erent net wages in the primary sector since they
di⁄er in training costs. For very low ability workers, the net wage is higher in
the secondary sector, so that they choose to work there. More able workers
will nd it pro table to apply in the primary sector but not all of them will be
hired. Typically, workers with intermediate abilities will be rationed and forc
to work in the secondary sector.
Second, and more importantly, the presence of the training cost may result
in a situation where the primary rm is rationed by the labor supply at the
e¢ciency wage. In this case, setting the standard e¢ciency wage is not anymore
an optimal strategy. There is a trade o⁄ for primary rms between inducing
the optimal e⁄ort through e¢ciency wages and having enough workers. Since
the rm has to solve two problems with only one instrument (the wage), it is
obvious that it could bene t from using a second instrument. Therefore, the
real question for the rm is: In our setting, two
policies are possible. In the rst one, the rm does not internalize the trainin
cost and sets a wage greater than the Solow e¢ciency wage along the labor
supply. When this happens, there is no rationing in the labor market so that
labor dualism does not prevail. In the other one, the rm bears all the training
cost. In this case, labor supply is in nitely elastic so that we observe rationi
at the equilibrium wages, i.e. labor dualism prevails. Thus,
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
general model when the share of the training cost is exogenously set. We show
that three market outcomes may result from e¢ciency wage considerations.
In section 3, we show what is the optimal policy for the primary rm when it
chooses wages, the employment level and its part of the training cost. We derive
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We will relax this assumption in the next section.
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when a worker is hired a contract is signed stipulating
that the worker must be perfectly matched with the rm and thus produces the






There are two sectors in the economy characterized by a large number of iden-
tical rms in each of them. Without loss of generality, we consider one repre-
sentative rm in each sector.
In the primary sector, jobs are complex and require a training period in
order to meet the productivity level required by the (representative) primary
rm. This means that
The quali cation level required by the primary
rm is equal to which is normalized to for analytical simplicity. We assume
that each worker is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor. We also assume
that, , there is a continuum of workers ranked by their decreasing ability
of learning a speci c training and distributed uniformly in the interval .
Firms are able to identify ex ante workers type. For simplicity, the density
of workers in each point of the interval is taken to be unity so that the total
workers in the economy is equal to . Each individual is characterized by a
parameter which is de ned so that the training cost is increasing in .
We assume here that the training cost is shared between the worker
and the rm, being the part borne by the rm. In this context, a
worker of type must bear a training cost equal to in order to work in
the primary rm. Therefore, after the training period ( ) all workers are
identical and provide the same level of e⁄ort within the rm.
In this sector, all workers who are identical have a utility function
equal to , where is the wage in the primary sector. We assume that
, , and . We will see later the point




Equation (2) leads to an e⁄ort function: with . By totally
di⁄erentiating (2), we have:
and
since and . We assume that the e⁄ort is so that
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of this type of e⁄ort function see Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, ch.3). The
employer knows that, given , the worker solves (1) Thus given the rm
selects a wage (the e¢ciency wage) that maximizes its pro t (Solow, 1979).
At this e¢ciency wage, all workers provide the corresponding e⁄ort
(see Figure 1 for an illustration of the e⁄ort function). Moreover, we assume
that the net equilibrium utility level for a worker of type in the primary sector
is equal to: , i.e. and the training cost problem are
separable from the worker s viewpoint.
To summarize there are two di⁄erent but independent problems, one
one . workers are heterogeneous and must be trained in order
to provide . , all workers are identical from the rm s viewpoint and
the optimal policy is to set an e¢ciency wage that maximize its pro ts. Since
the e¢ciency wage does not depend on the initial ability of workers and since
the net equilibrium utility for a type worker is , the
two problems are totally separable. We have therefore collapsed the two period
model into a one period one. An alternative approach would have been to set
a wage for each worker and therefore not to impose a perfect match between
workers and the rm. In equilibrium, there would be a distribution of wages
and all workers would still be heterogeneous . We have privileged the
former approach since our focus is on dual labor market where in the primary
sector all workers earn the same wage and are rationed. In the latter approach
there will obviously not be any rationing.
In the secondary sector, jobs are less complex so that no training is required
We also assume the e⁄ort in the secondary sector is perfectly observable and
is negligible. Perfect competition prevails in this market so that in equilibri
the competitive wage is such that workers in the secondary sector are indi⁄erent
between working in there or being unemployed. For the simplicity of exposition
let us denote by the reservation utility in the secondary sector.
In order to decide whether to work or not in the primary sector, a worker
of type trades o⁄ and . According to our previous
assumptions, the reservation wage is positively related to workers abilit y. Whe
, the worker decides to apply to the primary rm. The
marginal worker who is indi⁄erent between working in the primary rm and
in the secondary one is de ned by: We have therefore:
(3)
Equation (3) expresses the labor supply of the primary sector as a function
of the utility di⁄erence between the two sectors and the share of training cost.
This means that
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The larger the di⁄erence between the net primary and the secondary sector
utilities or the greater the part of the training cost nanced by the rm, the
higher . Thus, a worker of a lower ability is more and more ready to work in
the primary sector as soon as net utilities increase or training cost are lowere
We have now to determine the level of wage and employment set by the pri-
mary rm. Observe that in the secondary sector, rms pay the market clearing
wage and at this wage they can hire all workers they want. Obviously can
be interpreted as the level of unemployment bene t since in equilibrium work-
ers will be indi⁄erent between being unemployed and working in the secondary
sector (there is no rationing in this sector). The pro t function of the primary
rm writes:
(5)
where is the output price, the (aggregate) e⁄ort function of all workers,
, the level of employment and , the production function. We assume
that (Inada conditions) and
. Observe that what matters to rms is not the level of employment
but the e¢ciency level of it, We can rewrite (5) as:
(6)
where is the labor cost per unit of e⁄ort. Inspection of (6) suggests that
the wage determination is independent of the employment one. In a rst stage,
the rm solves the following program:
(7)
It is easy to show that we obtain:
(8)
where is the e¢ciency wage and , the elasticity of e⁄ort with respect
to wage. This is the so-called Solow condition (see Solow, 1979) stating that
the e¢ciency wage is such that the mean e⁄ort is equal to the marginal e⁄ort
(see Figure 1). Observe that the e¢ciency wage (8) does not depend on the
production function but only on the parameters of the e⁄ort function. Observe
also that it does not depend on , the training cost, since once employed all
workers must contribute to the same level of output whatever their initial ability
For this (e¢ciency) wage, the rm obtain an optimal e⁄ort level equal to:
(9)
Note that there will be rents for workers in the rm since there is a distribu-
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It is readily veri ed that the second order condition is always satis ed.
Note that we assume here that the rm is able to distinguish workers t ype, so that it hires rst
the most able workers in order to minimize training costs.
Since the secondary sector is a waiting sector, workers are indi⁄erent between working there
or being unemployed. Throughout the text, we will use indi⁄erently voluntary or involuntary
employed in the secondary sector and voluntary or involuntary unemployed .
a net utility level equal to . The e¢ciency wage is such
that (ex post) trained workers are all motivated and provide the e⁄ort level
So the higher the initial ability, the greater the net utility level (see Figure
We can now determine the level of e¢cient employment in the rm. The




Since the labor demand is de ned by:
(12)
Thus the optimal level of labor demand is obtained by equating the marginal
productivity and the general cost of labor per unit of e⁄ort. Three types of labor
market outcomes can obtain when the rm adopts this strategy .
(see Figure 3)
In this case, only workers of type are hired by the primary rm.
This means that there is an endogenous rationing due to the fact that at the
e¢ciency wage the labor demand is lower than the indi⁄erent worker . Even if
workers of type propose to work at a lower wage than the e¢ciency
wage (any wage that guarantee them to have a net wage greater than the
secondary wage), the primary rm refuses to hire them because they will not
provide the optimal e⁄ort level In other words, for the primary rm, a wage
cut will decrease its pro t because of the reduction of the marginal productivity
These workers are typically rationed since for all of them the utility level in t
primary sector ( ) is strictly greater than the
utility level in the secondary sector, i.e., . Thus, we can denote the worker
who are involuntary unemployed (or employed in the secondary sector) by
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the size of secondary sector is largely contingent on
the occurrence on demand shocks but also on the matching technology (through
The higher the degree of specialization of rms, the greater the rm-speci c
training and the larger the involuntary unemployment.
the secondary sector
does not recognize workers heterogeneity whereas the primary sector does.
Clearly, outcome 1 exhibits the main feature of a dual labor market under
e¢ciency wage since there is rationing in equilibrium. The only di⁄erence, which
results from workers heterogeneity is that only part of the secondary sector
workers are frustrated from being there. As it can be seen from (13), these
static comparative results on stem from two e⁄ects: the marginal worker
and the labor demand ones. The rst result in (14) is due to the fact that when
rises, the position of the marginal worker increases and the labor demand
decreases. The increase of the net utility level has a similar
interpretation. Concerning the secondary wage, , its e⁄ect is the following
when it rises, it does not a⁄ect but reduces the position of which switches
to the right and thus cuts . Last, when there is a negative demand shock,
i.e., the output price decreases, pro t maximizing rms hire less workers and
is increased. What about the voluntary part of unemployment
? Since these workers would all have a lower utility level in the primary sector
than in the secondary sector ( ), they prefer to work in
the secondary sector and they are therefore not rationed. We have:
(15)
We obtain the opposite results than (14) since an increase in or
a⁄ects only the marginal worker Of course, the latter is not a⁄ected by an
output price cut.
More generally, this equilibrium shows that, by introducing workers hetero-
geneity, the view of dual labor market becomes di⁄erent. The main part of the
secondary labor force is composed by workers who have a lower level of ability
than primary workers. Just a small part of the secondary sector can be em-
ployed in the primary sector and that depends on the labor demand and thus
on the state of nature. Thus,
.
Observe also that in
equilibrium, heterogeneous workers earn the same wage and enjoy the same
utility level in the secondary sector whereas in the primary sector, they have
the same wage but there is a distribution of utility levels, the more talented
workers enjoying the higher utility level. In some sense,
Let
us now de ne our second type of equilibrium.
(see Figure 4)
The conjuncture is better and the primary sector can hire all workers that
have a utility level greater than . Nobody is rationed and according to his





















3 The endogenous choice of the share of the
training cost
Thus with no rationing dual labor market still exist.
When is exogenous, three outcomes may emerge at the Solow
e¢ciency wage.
If the primary rm is not rationed with , the employment level is
determined by pro t maximization. Some workers are involuntary unem-
ployed.
If the primary rm is not rationed with , it does the same policy
but nobody is involuntary unemployed.
If the primary rm is rationed, i.e. , the standard e¢ciency wage
policy is not an equilibrium.
It is the heterogeneity of
workers that creates labor dualism. In equilibrium, we have the same results as
before in terms of wages and utility levels in the two sectors.
(see Figure 5)
All workers of type refuse to work in the primary sector because
their utility level is lower than the one in the secondary sector. Thus secondary
employment would coexist with labor demand rationing in the primary sector.
This suggests that Outcome 3 is not an equilibrium for the rm. Indeed, it
could contemplate to raise the wage in order to relax the labor supply constraint.
This illustrates the fact that e¢ciency wages are optimal only under excess
supply. However, when workers are not equally willing to enter the primary
sector, more generally when labor supply in the primary sector is not perfectly
elastic, we have no particular reason to think that excess supply will prevail a
e¢ciency wages. Note also that increasing would have the same e⁄ect. Indeed,
we may argue that part of the problem comes from the fact that the rm has
only one instrument in order to solve two di⁄erent problems: ensure e¢ciency
in the rm and attract workers. In the next section we will tackle this issue.
The following proposition summarizes our result.
In the previous section, we have assumed that the training cost was shared by
the rm and the workers. One could easily argue however that the primary rm
could be tempted to transfer as much as possible of that cost onto workers. This
is particularly clear when the primary rm bene ts from monopsonistic power.
Outcome 3 however has shown that the presence of positive training costs on
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policy. Obviously, one possible strategy for the primary rm in case of excess
demand at the e¢ciency wage would be to bear more training cost in order to
relax the constraint while preserving e¢ciency of labor in the rm. In order to
address this problem, we consider now that the rm can choose optimally
and . Therefore, the rm s problem is stated as follows:
(17)
The Lagrangian associated with (17) is given by ( is the Lagrange multi-
plier):
(18)
By di⁄erentiating with respect to , one obtains:
In other words, the Lagrangian is linear in and its slope can either be
negative or positive so that the optimal value of can be either or .
The following comments are in order. First, since the Lagrangian is linear in
, there are other solutions in which could take any value in . However,
we will focus only on corner solutions. Second, if the rm were not rationed
( at the e¢ciency wage solution), it would have chosen always .
Thus the possibility of arises because, in this case, the rm is no more
rationed ( ) and can hire as many workers as it wants. We have to study
now the two cases separately ( and ) and then compute the rm s
pro t in each case. In some sense, it is a two stage decision in which the rm
rst maximizes its pro t by choosing the optimal and for each , and then
decides which it chooses. Let us study rst the case .
The Lagrangian (18) writes now:
(19)











































We use the subscript to refer to this case.
We use the subscript 2 for this case.
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The rm sets and is not rationed:
If the rm chooses optimally and if
then the rm sets the e¢ciency wage (23) and the employment level (24).
rst best optimum
The rm sets and is rationed
rm never sets the Solow e¢ciency wage (in which case
) but always a greater one, i.e. . new
(22)
In order to solve this problem two di⁄erent cases must be contemplated:
CASE 1:
We consider an equilibrium candidate ( ) such that By
using (22), this implies that . By combining (20) and (21), we obtain the
e¢ciency wage as de ned by the Solow condition:
(23)
and the optimal level of employment is given by:
(24)
In this case, its (optimal) pro t function writes:
(25)
This proposition is quite intuitive. Since the rm is not rationed, it can
hire as many workers as it wants. In this case, it is obvious that is the
optimal policy since from the rm s viewpoint all workers are identical and we
are back to the standard e¢ciency wage model with homogeneous workers. In
other words, transferring all training costs onto workers is compatible with pur
e¢ciency wage considerations. It is therefore the . We now
turn to the case in which leads to a labor supply shortage at the e¢ciency
wage.
CASE 2: :
We consider an equilibrium candidate ( ) such that Ac-
cording to (22), two cases arise: and . If , we are back to the
previous case in which When , we must solve (20)
et (21) for and under the constraint that . First, it
its easily checked by combining (20) et (21) that:
Since , it must be that . This second condition implies
that the
We can calculate this
e¢ciency wage. By using (20) and (21), it is readily veri ed that this e¢ciency









Subscript 3 refers to this case.
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Let the rm choose optimally . If
then the rm sets the Solow e¢ciency wage (23). If
then the rm pays the e¢ciency wage (26) and employs
.
rm does not internalize
the training costs
net
it will never be optimal to set an e¢ciency
wage de ned by the Solow condition.
e¢ciency wage depends now on the shape of the
production function and thus on the rm s technology.
voluntary
and the associated optimal employment level is given by:
(27)
where is de ned by (26). Observe that because the labor demand
de ned by (26) is below the one de ne in case 1 (see Figure 6). We can write
now the optimal pro t level as:
(28)
The following comments are in order. First, the
and thus labor heterogeneity. In this context, there is a clear
hierarchy in terms of utility levels in the primary sector, the more able
workers obtaining the highest ones. Second, when the rm is constrained in
his labor supply and even if ,
The rm is induced to increase the Solow
e¢ciency wage up to the point where the marginal gain of employing an extra
worker is equal to the marginal loss in terms of global e⁄ort e¢ciency. Con-
trary to the Solow case, this
Last, the only possible
unemployment here is because some workers of type with middle
level abilities prefer than . Figure 6 illustrates Proposition 4
by comparing cases 1 and 2. If the rm is not rationed, it chooses the Solow
solution ( ). However, the labor supply constraint
is violated at since at this wage the labor demand is and the la-
bor supply is , with . According to (21), the labor demand when
is strictly below the one corresponding to the Solow case and therefore
the rm s optimal policy is to increase the wage along the labor supply curve
. The equilibrium is thus characterized by a higher wage and a lower level of
employment than in the Solow case.
Case 3: The rm sets
In this case, all workers are willing to work in the primary rm as soon as
is greater than . There is no rationing and thus no constraint.
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Let and . Then it is easilychecked that
and Then it must be that since (i.e. ).
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If the rm chooses optimally , then it sets the modi ed







First order conditions are given by:
(29)
(30)
By combining (29) and (30), we obtain the following e¢ciency wage:
(31)
which is de ned by a Solow condition in which the training cost is
strictly positive. Then by using (30), is the solution of the followingequatio
(32)
Observe that this e¢ciency wage is always greater than the one given by the
standard Solow condition (23). We have to check that there always exists a
unique labor market equilibrium. By di⁄erentiating (31), we have:
and by di⁄erentiating (32), we obtain:
(33)
which is negative if , where is the
elasticity of the marginal product with respect to the e¢cient units of labor.
Thus, there exists a unique labor market equilibrium in the plane ( ). The
optimal pro t function is equal to:
(34)
Observe that here contrary to cases 1 and 2, the primary rm
so that all workers in the primary sector obtain the same
utility level . In this context, heterogeneous workers
obtain two utility levels and depending on their initial
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all workers will apply in the primary sector. Figure 7 gives some intuition to
Proposition 5 by comparing it with case 1 (Solow). In case 3, we have an
increasing relation between wage and employment (31) which we called the
modi ed Solow relation (when , we obtain the Solow e¢ciency wage).
Indeed, when the rm employs an extra worker it pays a higher training cost
since the marginal training cost increases with . It must therefore rise the
e¢ciency wage in order to motivate this marginal worker. We have shown that
in this case the labor demand is strictly below the one corresponding to case
1 because of positive training cost. Consequently, as in case 2, equilibrium
involves a higher wage and a lower level of employment than in the Solow s
case.
We have now to analyze the optimal policy of the primary sector rm. It is
obvious that the rm will always choose , if this is compatible with the
Solow e¢ciency wage (23) and the corresponding employment level (24),
i.e. if the rm faces excess supply at this wage. This is the choice.
When it is rationed, it has two possibilities. If it chooses the rm bears
no training cost but it cannot set anymore the Solow e¢ciency wage since there
is a . It will set a wage above the Solow e¢ciency wage.
It is important to notice that in this case all workers exhibit the same level
of e¢ciency within the rm since there are all identical from the rm s
viewpoint. Thus when the rm increases it employs more workers (since
but the labor costs increases due to the fact that the
wage is above the e¢ciency level. If it chooses there is no more a labor
supply constraint but a . This training cost increases
with the employment level since at the margin the rm employs workers that
have to be more and more trained (the training cost rises with the type ). In
this case, the rm sets the modi ed Solow wage. Here contrary to the previous
case the trade-o⁄ is between and . In this context,
each worker can be viewed as exhibiting di⁄erent e¢ciency levels, re ecting
their training cost. The problem is not anymore how many workers to hire but
how many will be e¢cient enough to cover their training cost. Note that in this
case, very able workers subsidize the training costs of lower ability ones.
The rm faces thus a trade-o⁄ between what is lost in terms of each individ-
ual s e¢ciency, due to the higher wage (recall that the e¢ciency unit labor cost
increases for wages above ) and what is gained by employing more workers.
Choosing allows the rm to get rid of the labor supply constraint and
to use the wage only to induce e⁄ort but it imposes an extra cost (the training
cost). Choosing implies that the wage will be used only to increase the
labor supply while imposing e¢ciency losses for all workers. It is then obvi-
ous that the shape of the e⁄ort function will play a crucial role in determining
which of the two policies will be chosen. Indeed, the e¢ciency loss associated
with a given increase in the wage will be more important if the e⁄ort function
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the training cost in order to accommodate for a lower wage increase, and thus
a lower e¢ciency loss at the individual level. On the other hand, the higher the
reservation utility in the secondary sector, the larger the excess demand at the
Solow wage, the greater the incentive to relax totally this constraint, i.e. t
greater the incentive to bear the training cost. Finally, we should not expect
that the production function will play a very important role in the analysis since
it does not really discriminates between the two policies. In the next section we
study a numerical example which will help us to clarify these intuitions.
We assume that the utility function for a worker is:
(35)
with and . It is easily checked that:
By choosing that maximizes (35), each worker obtains the following e⁄ort
function (see Figure 1 for an illustration):
with
We assume that the production function writes:
(36)
where . In this context, the Solow e¢ciency wage corresponding to
case 1 writes now:
(37)
and the optimal e⁄ort function is:
(38)

































































Table 1: The benchmark numerical simulation model
Table 2: Variation of
In all tables, a numerical value with a star as a superscript indicates the best policy.
and the optimal pro t is:
(40)
Last, the optimal utility function is equal to:
For the two other cases (2 and 3), we cannot determine explicitly wage,
employment and pro t levels. However, by using numerical simulations we can
compute their values in all cases and compare them. In particular, we will see
the impact of a variation of , of the shape of the e⁄ort function through ,
and of the shape of the production function through on the di⁄erent equilibria
(Solow, case 2 and case 3). We start with the following benchmark numerical
values:
(41)
With (41), we obtain:
wage: Labor Demand: Labor Supply: Pro t:
Solow 1 0.5 0.125 0.5
Case 2 1.58 - 0.287 0.479
Case 3 1.44 0.245 - 0.445
It can easily seen that the best solution (in terms of pro t) for the rm is
to set the Solow e¢ciency wage. However it is not feasible since at this wage
and because workers bear the training costs, the rm is constrained in its labor
demand . In this context, the optimal solution is to choose (Case
2) and the e¢ciency wage (26), here equal to 1.58, since it yields the highest
pro t. Let us study the impact of a variation of on this equilibrium. We take
exactly the same numerical values as in (41), and we give di⁄erent values to
Solow with 1 0.5 0 0.5
Case 2 with 2.008 - 0.220 0.457
Case 3 with 1.44 0.245 - 0.446
Solow with 1 0.5 0 0.5
Case 2 with 2.23 - 0.195 0.445































































When varies, it a⁄ects and thus the labor supply. In this context, it has
no in uence on cases 1 and 3 in which there is no labor constraint: it thus a⁄ects
only case 2. Indeed, when is very high, less and less individuals are willing
to work in the primary sector and thus the labor supply constraint is greater.
When increases, decreases and the rm must set higher wages to attract
more workers; this reduces its pro t. Table 2 shows that when varies from
to , the rm has to increase its wage (from to ) and to reduce its
pro t but is still the best policy (Case 2). However, when , this is
not anymore true because the increase in wage yields a too large e¢ciency loss
and the rm prefers to bear all the training costs ( ), thereby allowing the
rm to hire as many workers as it wants, at a lower wage.
Let us focus now on the case when the shape of the e⁄ort function varies.
This is captured by a variation of : when is close to , the e⁄ort function
is nearly linear whereas when it close to the e⁄ort function is very concave.
Once again we start with the numerical values of (41) and we change only the
value of .
Solow with 1.45 0.356 0.281 0.517
Case 2 with 1.56 - 0.327 0.516
Case 3 with 1.95 0.212 - 0.482
Solow with 2.07 0.271 0.681 0.562
Case 2 with - - - -
Case 3 with - - - -
When increases slightly (from 0.5 to 0.6), Case 2 is still the optimal solutio
whereas when , the Solow solution becomes feasible since the rm is not
anymore constraint ( and this is obviously the rst
best solution in which and the e¢ciency wage is de ned by (23), here
equal to . This result is quite intuitive since when , the e⁄ort function
becomes more linear and workers are more paid (they need to be induced more):
the e¢ciency wage switches from 1 to 2.07. In this context, the rise of the
e¢ciency wage and thus of and is su¢ciently large to release the
rm s labor constraint.
Solow with 0.634 0.829 0.055 0.525
Case 2 with 1.599 - 0.249 0.441
Case 3 with 1.052 0.289 - 0.430
Solow with 0.326 2.019 0.022 0.657
Case 2 with 1.61 - 0.214 0.403
Case 3 with 0.717 0.353 - 0.441
When decreases, the e⁄ort function becomes more and more concave. The
standard e¢ciency wage is decreasing and the associated labor demand is in-
16DS
5 Final Remarks









































creasing. In this case, increasing the wage becomes more and more costly in
terms of e¢ciency loss for each worker. Therefore, the primary rm is more
likely to support all the training costs. Table 3b gives us a good illustration
this point. When switches from to , the rm is constrained and
is still the best policy. However, as soon as , it is optimal for the rm to
bear all the training cost and to set the modi ed e¢ciency wage de ned by (31),
here equal to 0.717. The last e⁄ect that we want to study is the modi cation
of the production function through a variation of . We start again with the
numerical values of (41) and we vary .
Solow with 1 0.609 0.125 0.261
Case 2 with 1.63 - 0.302 0.232
Case 3 with 1.436 0.238 - 0.199
Solow with 1 0.557 0.125 0.371
Case 2 with 1.62 - 0.299 0.346
Case 3 with 1.45 0.247 - 0.312
Solow with 1 0.434 0.125 0.651
Case 2 with 1.52 - 0.268 0.636
Case 3 with 1.42 0.230 - 0.606
Solow with 1 0.358 0.125 0.836
Case 2 with 1.42 - 0.242 0.826
Case 3 with 1.386 0.209 - 0.801
The following comments are in order. First, when varies, the Solow e¢-
ciency wage is not a⁄ected (it is always equal to 1) but the labor demand is.
This is a standard result in which this wage does not depend on the parameters
of the production function. Second, whatever the value of and thus of the
shape of the production function, the best policy seems to be (Case 2).
This is due to the fact that the shape of the production function a⁄ects both
policies and whereas a variation of (the e⁄ort function) a⁄ects
only the policy . Note that for a su¢ciently low value of , the Solow
e¢ciency wage will become an equilibrium, since labor demand is positively
related to .
In this paper, we have considered a labor market where labor dualism is likely
to prevail due to e¢ciency wage setting in the primary sector. However, when
access to the primary sector is conditional on training cost, it is not obviou
that the primary sector will face excess supply at the e¢ciency wage. In our
framework, workers are heterogeneous through training costs, so that the labor
supply in the primary sector is nitely elastic. We have shown that when the
wage alone is not able to ensure both individual e¢ciency and a su¢cient labor
supply, rms choose among two strategies: either they cope with the labor
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